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WAS THE ERITREA–ETHIOPIA 
CLAIMS COMMISSION MERELY A 
ZERO-SUM GAME?:  EXPOSING THE 
LIMITS OF ARBITRATION IN 
RESOLVING VIOLENT 
TRANSNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Ari Dybnis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia filed claims against each other in the 
Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (Commission) for humanitarian 
international law violations that arose from a violent border dispute 
between the two countries.1 Eritrea claimed approximately $6 billion in 
damages,2 while Ethiopia countered with claims for approximately 
$14.3 billion in damages.3 Nearly ten years later, on August 17, 2009, 
the Commission reached a final determination on these damage claims.4 
The Commission awarded approximately $174 million to Ethiopia, and 
approximately $161 million to Eritrea.5 The practical result of these 
awards, however, is a mere $13 million judgment that Eritrea owes to 
 
* I would like to acknowledge Dawn Shock who first brought the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims 
Commission to my attention and Cesare Romano who helped me avoid some serious pitfalls 
when I first began structuring my thoughts for this note. I would also like to dedicate this to Josh 
Dybnis who would have scrutinized this entire Note purely to challenge me on every argument 
and assertion. 
 1. See Final Award—Ethiopia’s Damages Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 631, ¶ 5 (Eri.–
Eth. Claims Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter EECC Ethiopia Final Award]. 
 2. Eritrea Takes Advantage Over Ethiopia in War Damages Award, REPORTER (Aug. 22, 
2009), http://en.ethiopianreporter.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1547. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Duncan Hollis, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission Awards Final Damages, OPINIO 
JURIS (Aug. 19, 2008, 9:42 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/08/19/Eritrea–Ethiopia-claims-
commission-awards-final-damages. 
 5. Id. 
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the Ethiopian government, none of which is assured to reach any of the 
actual victims of the violence.6 
There is a common saying that “if something is worth doing, then 
it is worth doing right.” In the international context, the “right way” to 
redress a wrong is often impractical, infeasible, or even unknowable 
until after the fact. It is within this framework that this Note contends 
that the Commission was not the “right way” to address the damage that 
thousands of victims suffered as a result of the border conflict between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
The commissioners of the Commission were able to accomplish 
admirable feats with their allotted resources and employed some 
sophisticated techniques and methodologies to determine the final 
awards. However, these ultimately ineffective final awards highlight the 
inherent limitations of traditional arbitration as a method for redressing 
mass claims of humanitarian violations. The governments should have 
utilized modern alternative mechanisms that international bodies have 
developed to address mass claims specifically, instead of relying on the 
traditional arbitration model. Utilization of these mechanisms would 
have increased the chances that the actual victims of the war could 
receive any sort of justice. 
In Part I, this Note will explain the background of the Commission, 
including the history of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
that raged between 1998 and 2000, the composition of the Commission, 
and the Commission’s ten-year history. Part II will explain how the 
inherent structural problems in the Commission’s arbitration model 
prevent the final monetary awards from providing victims with just 
compensation, despite the admirable work done by the commissioners. 
These structural problems result in awards that effectively cancel out 
without providing any meaningful benefit to the victims. Part II will 
also explore how these same structural defects prevented the 
Commission from assuring peace and security in the international 
community. 
Part III will then describe the history and structure of the United 
Nations Compensation Commission and the Bosnia Commission for 
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons, two modern examples of 
 
 6. The money will go to the governments because the claims were only filed for 
government-to-government violations; the Commission, however, “encouraged the Parties to 
consider how, in the exercise of their discretion, compensation can best be used to accomplish the 
humanitarian objectives” of their peace agreement. EECC Ethiopia Final Award, supra note 1, 
¶ 25. Without any official mandate it is dubious that the money will actually reach victims, as 
explained later in this Note. 
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commissions that have enjoyed success. Part III will also discuss the 
success of these two commissions as compared to those of the 
Commission, and why they should have had a stronger impact on the 
latter. 
Finally, just because there might exist an alternative “right way,” 
there are admittedly many road-blocks that obstruct the implementation 
of such mechanisms. The principal obstacles are resources, time, and 
the will to implement a better system. Part IV will explore these 
impediments and address their impacts, ultimately concluding that 
despite these serious considerations, the involved parties could have 
implemented a modern claims commission that would have resulted in a 
more just outcome. 
II.  THE ERITREA–ETHIOPIA CONFLICT AND AN AGREEMENT TO 
ARBITRATE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
A.  Conflict Arose from a Dispute over the Border Town of Badme and 
Quickly Developed into a Violent Two-Year War 
Eritrea and Ethiopia are neighboring countries with intermeshed 
histories located in the northeastern part of Africa.7 Eritrea was 
previously a province of Ethiopia, but in 1993 the people of Eritrea won 
their independence.8 Relative peace existed between the two countries 
until 1998, when the two neighbors engaged in a deadly war covering 
multiple fronts along their common border.9 This conflict displaced and 
affected hundreds of thousands of people.10 
The conflict began in May when the two parties began to fight 
over who could claim the territory of Badme.11 Each side blamed the 
 
 7. See Eritrea Country Profile, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/country_profiles/1070813.stm. 
 8. See Partial Award:  Civilian Claims—Eritrea’s Claims 15–16, 23, 27–32 (Eri. v. Eth.), 
26 R.I.A.A. 197, 205 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004) [hereinafter EECC Civilian Claims]; 
Christine Gray, The Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission Oversteps its Boundaries:  A Partial 
Award?, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 699, 700 n.3 (2006). 
 9. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES:  
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 33 (Howard M. Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir eds., 
2007). 
 10. Id.; UNMEE:  United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Background, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/unmee/background.html (last visited Sept. 6, 
2011) [hereinafter Background] (“As of March 2000, it was estimated that over 370,000 Eritreans 
and approximately 350,000 Ethiopians had been affected by the war. The humanitarian situation 
in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by the severe drought, which led to the emergence of a major 
food crisis with almost 8 million people affected.”). 
 11. Gray, supra note 8, at 700. 
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other for instigating the initial fighting.12 The fundamental conflict 
concerned the location of the border between the two countries—what 
one side characterized as an invasion, the other characterized as a 
domestic occupation.13 Within one month, the fighting spread along the 
entire border between the two countries.14 Later the same year, the 
Organization of African Unity15 and the United Nations Security 
Council both observed the severity of the conflict and attempted to 
intervene so as to calm the dispute.16 On December 17, 1998, the 
Organization of African Unity drafted a “framework agreement” calling 
on Eritrea to withdraw troops from Badme so that the cartographic 
section of the United Nations could determine and demarcate the 
border.17 Eritrea did not accept the proposal, believing that such a 
withdrawal might indicate a concession that the territory belonged to 
Ethiopia.18 Consequently, the violence continued to rage. 
By early 1999, the conflict had escalated into a full-scale war.19 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations contacted the leaders of 
Eritrea and Ethiopia and urged them to resolve the matter peacefully.20 
The countries ignored these pleas and the violence continued until 
Eritrea finally accepted the framework agreement on February 27, 
1999.21 By this point, Ethiopia’s military position had strengthened and, 
as a result, Ethiopia refused to accept the agreement.22 Instead, Ethiopia 
demanded that Eritrea automatically recognize Ethiopia’s sovereignty 
over all of the territories in dispute, rather than letting the United 
Nations demarcate the border.23 Finally, on May 17, 2000, the United 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law:  The 
Jurisprudence of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission in the Hague, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 23, 
28 (2007). 
 15. The Organization of African Unity is now known as the African Union. Organization of 
African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU), DEP’T INT’L RELATIONS & COOPERATION, S. AFR., 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/oau.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 16. See Gray, supra note 8, at 701. 
 17. See id. at 701–02. 
 18. See id. at 702. Oxford Professor Christine Gray argues that Eritrea’s concerns were 
ultimately justified by the Commission’s Partial Award on jus ad bellum claims, which assigned 
liability for the conflict to Eritrea. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Background, supra note 10. 
 21. See Gray, supra note 8, at 702. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
  
2011]  Exposing the Limits of Arbitration 259 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1298, which imposed 
sanctions and trade restrictions on the two countries.24 
B.  Fighting Ceased When the Countries Signed the Algiers Agreement, 
Which Created the Commission to Arbitrate Violations of Humanitarian 
Law 
In June 2000, the two countries began to negotiate a ceasefire 
agreement,25 followed by a full peace agreement in December 2000.26 
This agreement is known as the “Algiers Agreement,” because the 
parties negotiated and signed it in Algiers.27 The parties never published 
details of the negotiation, “but it is known that Eritrean and Ethiopian 
negotiators and their legal advisers met with legal experts familiar with 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United Nations Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) in Geneva, and other contemporary Mass Claims 
Processes.”28 This agreement was the result of substantial pressure from 
and efforts by the international community to end the conflict.29 
The Algiers Agreement called for the creation of three bodies:  
(1) an independent body created under the Organization of African 
Unity to “determine the origins of the conflict,” (2) a neutral boundary 
commission to officially demarcate the border between the two 
countries, and (3) a neutral tribunal to arbitrate claims of international 
law violations.30 The first body was never established, and the second 
body is known as the Boundary Commission.31 The third body is the 
Commission.32 
 
 24. See Background, supra note 10; S.C. Res. 1298, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (May 17, 
2000).  
 25. Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the State of Eritrea 
and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eri.–Eth., June 18, 2000, 
2138 U.N.T.S. 37273. 
 26. Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.–Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 [hereinafter 
Algiers Agreement]; see also Gray, supra note 8, at 703; Identical Letters Dated 12 December 
2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations Addressed to the 
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1183 (Dec. 13, 
2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 34. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, arts. 3–5. 
 31. See Gray, supra note 8, at 703. 
 32. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1; Gray, supra note 8, at 703. 
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The Algiers Agreement required that: 
[T]he [Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims] Commission is to decide through 
binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one 
Government against the other, and by nationals (including both 
natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of 
the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party . . . . 
The Commission shall not hear claims arising from the cost of 
military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of 
force, except to the extent that such claims involve violations of 
international humanitarian law.33 
The Algiers Agreement was specific in the overall goal of the 
Commission, yet it afforded the Commission an incredible amount of 
flexibility in determining particular procedures for handling claims and 
in modifying its own rules.34 The adopted rules of procedure and rules 
of evidence were original to the Commission, although they were based 
on the “Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating 
Disputes Between Two States,” which itself is based on the “United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law.”35 In addition, the 
Commission still retained the ability to modify the rules after 
consultation with the parties.36 
According to the Algiers Agreement, the Commission was to 
decide claims resulting from violations of international humanitarian 
law, but not claims arising from actual military operations or use of 
force, unless they too involved violations of international humanitarian 
law.37 The relevant rules of law the Commission followed were:  
(1) international conventions, (2) international custom, (3) general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and (4) previous 
judicial and arbitral decisions.38 
 
 33. Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1. 
 34. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 51. 
 35. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2 (2000), 
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Rules%20of%20Procedure.PDF; Jon Lockart & 
Tania Voon, Reviewing Appellate Review in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 6 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 474, 481 (2005). 
 36. Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, supra note 35, art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 37. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 1. 
 38. See Partial Award:  Central Front—Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 155, 
¶ 13 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004); Partial Award:  Prisoners of War—Eritrea’s Claim 17 
(Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 23, ¶ 31 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003) [hereinafter EECC Prisoners 
of War]. 
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The Algiers Agreement also defined the structure and organization 
of the Commission.39 It created the Commission under the auspices of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, located in The Hague, which acted 
as a base and as a registry for the Commission.40 The Permanent Court 
of Arbitration stored and cataloged the parties’ pleadings and acted as a 
intermediary between the parties and the Commission.41 Outside of the 
services the Permanent Court of Arbitration provided, all costs resulting 
from the Commission were split equally among the two governments.42  
As for the actual composition of the Commission, it was comprised 
of five arbitrators.43 These commissioners only worked on a part-time 
basis.44 Aside from the commissioners and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the Commission “employ[ed] no full-time staff” and relied 
heavily upon email “to limit travel and other costs.”45 
The structure of the Commission was similar to traditional 
arbitration tribunals, yet unlike traditional arbitration mechanisms, the 
Algiers Agreement created the Commission to arbitrate a binding and 
final conclusion without any possibility of appeal.46 Yet despite 
declaring the Commission’s decisions as final and binding, the Algiers 
Agreement provided no method for enforcement of judgments.47 
Originally, the mandate for the Commission required a three-year 
deadline to arbitrate all claims.48 The Algiers Agreement provided no 
procedure for extending this deadline, nor did either party request or 
attempt to extend this deadline.49 The Commission therefore only 
accepted claims that the parties filed within the first year of its existence 
and extinguished all later claims, in an attempt to meet the three-year 
deadline.50 Both Eritrea and Ethiopia filed claims past the deadline and 
 
 39. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 29. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 308. 
 42. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 15; PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 362–63. 
 43. Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 2. 
 44. See PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 308. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 17 (“Decisions and awards of the 
commission shall be final and binding. The parties agree to honor all decisions and to pay any 
monetary awards rendered against them promptly.”). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. art. 5, ¶ 12. 
 49. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 9, at 162. 
 50. The Algiers Agreement states that “[a]ll claims submitted to the Commission shall be 
filed no later than one year from the effective date of this Agreement . . . .  [S]uch claims which 
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the Commission refused to consider them due to the lack of timeliness.51 
As this Note will explore in Part II, this deadline played an important 
role in how the Commission evolved. Ultimately, it became very clear 
to the commissioners that the three-year deadline was unrealistic and 
they agreed to extend the deadline, which is how the Commission then 
expanded into a ten-year process.52 
Both Eritrea and Ethiopia asserted a huge variety of claims, so the 
Commission decided to lump the States’ claims into categories which it 
could then systematically address.53 These categories included: 
Category 1 – Claims of natural persons for unlawful expulsion from 
the country of their residence; Category 2 – Claims of natural 
persons for unlawful displacement from their residence; Category 3 – 
Claims of prisoners of war for injuries suffered from unlawful 
treatment; Category 4 – Claims of civilians for unlawful detention 
and injuries suffered from unlawful treatment during detention; 
Category 5 – Claims of persons for loss, damage or injury other than 
those covered by the other categories; Category 6 – Claims of [the 
two party] Governments for loss, damage or injury.54 
Also, both parties drafted extensive filings that the Commission 
then followed with private hearings.55 International aid organizations 
and advocacy groups could have provided information to the 
government parties, but only the governments themselves were actually 
allowed to file information with the Commission directly.56 
C.  The Boundary Commission, Partial Awards of the Commission, 
Resistance of the Two Parties, and Enforcement Issues 
The Boundary Commission, the second commission formed under 
the Algiers Agreement, issued its findings in a decision on April 13, 
 
could have been and were not submitted by that deadline shall be extinguished, in accordance 
with international law.” Algiers Agreement, supra note 26, art. 5, ¶ 8. 
 51. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 48–51. 
 52. See Final Award—Eritrea’s Damages Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 505, 518 (Eri.–
Eth. Claims Comm’n 2009) [hereinafter EECC Eritrea Final Award]. 
 53. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n (Eri. v. Eth.), Decision No. 2, available at 
http://pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Decision%202.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, ¶¶ 6, 10; EECC Ethiopia Final 
Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6, 10 (discussing the pleadings and hearings that took place). 
 56. See generally Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Rules of Procedure, supra note 35, 
art. 13 (describing the arbitral procedures of hearings). 
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2002.57 The decision indicated that Badme, the site of the original 
outbreak of violence, was an Eritrean territory.58 Both parties initially 
accepted the border decision on paper, but once the Commission set out 
to physically demarcate the border, the decision was met with severe 
resistance by Ethiopia.59 Ethiopia refused to allow preparations for the 
demarcation on the property it controlled.60 In 2003, Ethiopia wrote a 
letter to the United Nations Secretary General declaring that the 
Boundary Commission’s decision was “totally illegal, unjust and 
irresponsible.”61 In response, Eritrea refused to allow the demarcation of 
another part of the border until Ethiopia allowed its portion to be 
demarcated.62 The Commission hit a standstill and, as a result, the 
Boundary Commission’s work still has yet to be completed, despite 
numerous United Nations resolutions urging such action.63 
In October 2005, exasperated by Ethiopia’s refusal to comply with 
the boundary ruling, Eritrea refused to cooperate with the United 
Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE)—a monitor 
mission—and forbade its helicopters in Eritrean airspace.64 As a result, 
on July 30, 2008, the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1827,65 which terminated the United Nations 
Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia.66 The Resolution again implored 
Eritrea and Ethiopia to refrain from threats or force against one 
 
 57. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Apr. 15, 2002 from the Secretary-General to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2002/423 (Apr. 15, 2002) (by Kofi A. Annan). 
 58. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Comm’n (Eri. v. Eth.), Decision Regarding Delimitation 
of the Border Between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
¶¶ 5.94–5.95, U.N. Doc. S/2002/423 (Apr. 13, 2002); Gray, supra note 8, at 700, 707–08. 
 59. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
U.N. Sec. Council, ¶¶ 3–4, U.N. Doc 2/2002/744 (July 10, 2002). 
 60. See id. ¶ 4. 
 61. U.N. Secretary-General, Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, U.N. Sec. Council, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 2/2003/1186 (Dec. 19, 2003) (containing the 
Eleventh Report of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Appendix 1). 
 62. See id. ¶ 12; U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, U.N. Sec. Council, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc 2/2005/142 (Mar. 7, 2005) (containing the Sixteenth 
Report of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission). 
 63. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1430, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1430 (Aug. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1466, U.N. 
Doc S/RES/1466 (Mar. 14, 2003); S.C. Res. 1507, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1507 (Sept. 12, 2003); S.C. 
Res. 1531, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1531 (Mar. 12, 2004); S.C. Res. 1560, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1560 
(Sept. 14, 2004). 
 64. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
¶ 2, U.N Sec. Council, U.N. Doc 2/2006/1 (Jan. 3, 2006). 
 65. S.C. Res. 1827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1827 (July 30, 2008). 
 66. Last Peacekeepers Leave UNMEE, U.N. MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA, 
http://unmee.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=54&ctl=Details&mid=376&ItemID=368 (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
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another.67 Resolution 1827 was one of twenty-eight resolutions the 
United Nations Security Council passed between 1998 and 2008, 
deploring the violence and demanding an immediate end to hostility, 
which the two countries continued to ignore.68 
At the same time, the Commission continued its work and sought 
to find liability for the conflict of 1998 to 2000.69 It began this work in 
March 2001 and came to a conclusion on this issue in December 2005.70 
In addition to the question of liability, the Commission rendered 
multiple “partial awards.”71 The Commission heard arguments 
concerning its first substantive claim, concerning prisoners of war, in 
December 2002.72 The Commission submitted a partial award for this 
claim on July 1, 2003.73 The Commission held a second hearing, 
concerning claims associated with the central front, in November 2003, 
which was followed by another partial award on April 28, 2004.74 In all 
of these judgments, the Commission found violations of international 
law on both sides.75 
In April 2005, the Commission held another hearing concerning 
claims that included Eritrea’s Western Front, Aerial Bombardment, 
Pensions, Diplomatic, and Non-Resident Property Loss Claims, in 
addition to Ethiopia’s Western and Eastern Front, Port, Economic Loss, 
Diplomatic, and Jus ad Bellum (justification for going to war) claims.76 
It rendered partial awards for all these claims on December 19, 2005.77 
 
 67. S.C. Res. 1827, supra note 65, ¶ 2. 
 68. See UNMEE:  United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, U.N. Documents, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/resolutions.html 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011) (listing all Resolutions passed during this interval). 
 69. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). Professor 
Christine Gray has persuasively argued that this question of liability was outside the jurisdiction 
of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claim Commission’s mandate. Because, however, the Organization of 
African Unity never formed the first commission described in the Algiers Agreement, the liability 
commission, the Commission, had to find liability to conclude its mandate. See generally Gray, 
supra note 8, at 714–20 (explaining the Commission’s approach to determining liability for the 
war). 
 70. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69. 
 71. Awards are “partial” in that they do not become final until after the subsequent damages 
phase. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. EECC Prisoners of War, supra note 38; Partial Award:  Prisoners of War—Ethiopia’s 
Claim 4 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 73 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2003). 
 74. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69. 
 75. See Kidane, supra note 14, at 31–33. 
 76. See Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, supra note 69. 
 77. See id. 
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One of the most important conclusions of these hearings was that 
Eritrea actually caused the initial conflict when it carried out a series of 
unlawful armed attacks against Ethiopia, violating Article 2, Paragraph 
4 of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state.78 However, the Commission reserved judgment and damage 
amounts for a later final award determination.79 
D.  The Commission Announces Its Final Damages Award 
Determinations 
On August 17, 2009, the Commission rendered two final awards 
on damages.80 One award was to Eritrea for $161,455,000, plus an 
additional $2,065,865 for six individual claimants, and the other award 
was to Ethiopia for $174,036,520.81 This left a difference of 
$10,515,655 that Eritrea owed to Ethiopia. These awards were for the 
claims that the Commission heard in previous hearings between July 1, 
2003, and December 19, 2005, for which it had only made partial 
awards and no determination on damages.82 
In reference to these awards, Martin Plaut, an Africa analyst for the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, very succinctly explained that the 
“real tragedy is that the money, like the rest of the internationally 
supported peace process, will settle very little.”83 The following sections 
of this Note seek to explain the validity of Plaut’s assertion and to offer 
some possible alternatives that the countries and the international 
community could have taken to avoid such an unfortunate result. 
 
 78. Partial Award:  Jus Ad Bellum—Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 457, 
¶ 16 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005). 
 79. See id. ¶ 3. 
 80. See Press Release, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Comm’n, Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims 
Commission Renders Final Awards on Damages, (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.pca-cpa.org/ 
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III.  THE COMMISSION FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION TO THE 
VICTIMS AND AWARDS THAT WOULD MEANINGFULLY FURTHER PEACE 
AND SECURITY IN THE REGION 
A.  At Best, the Final Awards Fund the Coffers of the Warring Parties 
But Do Not Adequately Assure Any Compensation to the Actual Victims 
for the Harm They Suffered During the Conflict 
The damages the Commission granted to the two countries were 
primarily for harms suffered by individuals, yet these amounts were not 
awarded to the individuals themselves. For example, the Eritrea award 
included damages for:  loss of business property and buildings; injuries 
to civilians due to loss of health care caused by the conflict; damage to 
cultural property; mistreatment of prisoners of war; failure to prevent 
rape; forcible expulsions; arbitrary deprivation of citizenship for dual 
citizens; failure to provide care to expelled nationals; failure to provide 
compensation for vehicles requisitioned by nonresident citizens; other 
property losses of nonresident citizens; imprisonment under harsh 
conditions for civilians on security charges; violations of diplomatic 
premises and property; and interference with departing diplomats.84 
This discrepancy was also true for Ethiopia’s claims that included 
damages for:  death, injury, disappearance, forced labor, and 
conscription of citizens; failure to prevent rape; destruction and looting 
of houses; looting and damage to government buildings and 
infrastructure; destruction and looting of religious institutions; 
mistreatment of prisoners of war; failure to protect citizens from threats 
and violence; failure to ensure Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea access to 
employment; failure to assure that Ethiopians received medical care 
comparable to Eritrean citizens; wrongful detention of civilians; failure 
to protect property of detainees expelled from Eritrea; and failure to 
ensure the safe repatriation of departing Ethiopians.85 
As the Commission found in an earlier partial ruling that ultimate 
liability for the conflict laid with Eritrea, the Ethiopian award included 
damages for jus in bello (conduct during war) claims and jus ad bellum 
(justification for going to war) claims.86 Therefore, the Ethiopian award 
also included jus ad bellum damages for:  human suffering and loss of 
income associated with internal displacement of persons; civilian death 
and injury; damage to civilian property; damage to public buildings and 
 
 84. See EECC Eritrea Final Award, supra note 52, at 629–30, ¶¶ 1–18. 
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 86. See id. ¶ 7. 
  
2011]  Exposing the Limits of Arbitration 267 
infrastructure; looting and destruction of religious institutions; death 
and injury caused by Eritrean landmines; destruction of government 
facilities and other government losses; lost profits for certain private 
businesses; and reconstruction and assistance to internally displaced 
persons.87 
More significantly, individual human beings felt the consequences 
of these violations, such as the claims for rape and forced labor; 
however, the Commission awarded the final monetary damages solely 
to the States, and not to the individual victims or to the States as trustees 
for the individual victims.88 In its final decisions, the Commission 
repeatedly “encouraged” the parties to consider how the awards could 
be used to accomplish humanitarian objectives or compensate the 
victims,89 and it also requested the parties explain how they intended to 
distribute the damages.90 Yet there was no demand for the States to take 
any specific actions with the awards.91 Because the awards were not 
conditional on the countries’ compensating the individual victims 
within their borders, the final awards will essentially fill the general 
coffers of the respective countries to be spent as the countries see fit. 
This result, however, was not solely the fault of the commissioners 
when reaching their conclusion on damages. It was necessary for the 
Commission to award damages in this way because, for the most part, 
the countries only filed claims for nation-to-nation harms, rather than 
harms that the nations caused against individual victims.92 
The Commission established a mass claims process by which the 
parties could have filed claims for individuals.93 This process included 
fixed tiers of compensation for individual claims.94 The different tiers 
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depended upon how many categories of damages corresponded with 
each individual’s claim.95 The two parties were to provide standard 
paper and electronic claim forms, based on the forms that the 
Commission planned to prepare for any individual claims.96 The 
Commission intended to use computers and docket management 
software to select sample groups, using expert advised characteristics as 
a guide when setting sufficient compensation for certain sub-groupings 
of claims.97 This procedure was a very innovative and progressive 
measure that could have streamlined the imposing project. 
Nonetheless, one of the major failures of this scheme was that the 
Algiers Agreement did not address any mechanism to inform potential 
claimants of their eligibility to file claims under the Commission.98 
Instead, this responsibility was left to the States themselves.99 
Additionally, the Algiers Agreement did not give priority to these 
individual claims over the nation-to-nation claims, nor did it mandate 
that the nations file these individual claims if they decided to file 
nation-to-nation claims.100 Consequently, despite the availability of this 
mass claims option, the parties chose only to file government-to-
government claims, with the exception of six claims which Eritrea filed 
on behalf of six individuals whom Ethiopia had expelled.101 
These problems might not have resulted in the abandonment of 
individual claims had it not been for the deadline that the Commission 
set for the collection of claims and the time that it would take to 
adequately collect individuals’ claims. The mandate for the Commission 
called for a three-year deadline to arbitrate all claims.102 Accordingly, to 
adhere to this timetable, the Commission only accepted claims filed 
within the first year of its existence, extinguishing all later claims.103 
Further, the Algiers Agreement provided no procedure for extending 
this deadline.104 If not for this deadline, then the parties might have 
considered collecting individuals’ claims and utilizing the mass claims 
procedure. 
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The Commission actually noted that filing inter-State claims 
instead of individual claims was understandable, “given limits of time 
and resources.”105 Additionally, experts from the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), who were serving the Commission 
as technical consultants, also expressed the opinion that an adequate 
mass claims procedure required more time to collect claims than the 
designated one-year deadline.106 Paradoxically, this deadline was a 
significant factor in inhibiting the parties from filing individuals’ 
claims, as the deadline was a result of the Commission’s attempt to 
hasten its work to meet the “recurring concern that the proceeds 
accruing from the damages proceedings be used by the Parties to assist 
civilian victims of the conflict.”107 
The deadline set by the Commission does not solely explain why 
the parties chose to abandon the mass claims option. In addition to the 
deadline, there appears to have been a lack of will among the parties to 
find compensation for individuals who suffered harm. This is first 
illustrated by the fact that neither party requested nor attempted to 
extend the filing deadline.108 Both Eritrea and Ethiopia disregarded the 
time limit and attempted to file inter-State claims past the deadline, yet 
never attempted to file individuals’ claims.109 Furthermore, once it 
became clear that the three-year timetable to handle all claims was 
unrealistic, the commissioners agreed to extend the three-year 
deadline.110 It is reasonable to assume that if the commissioners were 
willing to extend the deadline for the Commission’s work, then they 
may have been willing to extend the filing deadline if the parties had 
expressed such a desire. Additionally, a lack of will to file individual 
claims is also evidenced by the fact that the parties did not push for 
separate individual claims, despite having already documented 
individuals’ claims on claim forms in an effort to facilitate the 
preparation of damages for the States’ own actions.111 There was 
actually a system in place for individual claims, but the two countries 
involved did not care to use it, the Commission made it harder for these 
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countries to use it, and the Commission never organized the process in a 
way that forced the parties to give priority to individual claims for 
humanitarian violations. 
B.  The Ten Million Dollar Difference Between Ethiopia’s Award of 
$174,036,520 and Eritrea’s Award of $161,455,000 Did Not Provide 
Adequate Compensation 
An award of over a hundred million dollars may seem like a lot of 
money to the average person, but to the average nation state it is a 
pittance. Yet an award in this range could be significant to an extremely 
impoverished country. The award is sizeable enough to provide some 
sort of deterrence against disapproved future actions and could provide 
at least some relief to victims. This is probably the thought process of 
the Commission when it made its final awards. 
However, in a broader context, these awards are drastically 
insufficient. Because the damages are an exchange of money between 
states, the majority of, or entirety of, the award one country receives 
will only cover the amount owed to the other. This exchange results in 
an approximately $10 million difference that Eritrea owes Ethiopia. 
This is only 0.25% of the annual gross domestic product (GDP) of 
Eritrea,112 which has a relatively small GDP as one of the poorest 
nations in the world.113 The amount is insignificant in part because the 
Commission heavily discounted the final award amounts, leaving it 
impossible for either party to be fairly compensated. 
Even if the full amount of the final awards went directly to 
compensating victims of Ethiopia and Eritrea’s unlawful actions then 
there still would not be just compensation because the amount was 
inadequate. The commissioners had the herculean task to wade through 
the mass of information which the two parties provided it to concoct a 
reasonable figure for damage awards. After tabulating reasonable 
amounts, however, the Commission then discounted many of these 
amounts depending on the reliability of the evidence,114 and then 
discounted these amounts even further due to consideration of the 
wealth, or lack thereof, of the two countries.115 This deep, and in many 
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cases seemingly arbitrary, discounting resulted in final award amounts 
that were far from the amounts the Commission determined as fair 
compensation for the parties’ wrongful actions. 
In the opening paragraphs of the final award decisions, the 
Commission explained that the awards “probably do not reflect the 
totality of damages that either Party suffered in violation of 
international law. Instead, they reflect the damages that could be 
established with sufficient certainty through the available evidence in 
the context of complex international legal proceedings carried out by 
the Parties with modest resources and under necessary pressures of 
time.”116 
These opening lines explain the balance the Commission attempted 
to strike between certainty and fair compensation. Essentially, it 
concedes that the awards are not adequate, and reveal that there are 
issues with the Commission’s structure that inherently restricted it from 
allowing a fair resolution of the circumstances. 
The Commission depended solely upon the information that the 
two parties provided to it. Other organizations could have presented 
evidence to the parties, but not directly to the Commission.117 
Additionally, the Commission did not have the staff or resources to 
conduct its own investigations.118 Therefore, it often did not have 
sufficient evidence and had to resort to employing “estimation” or 
“guesswork” to determine the amount of compensation for particular 
claims.119 For example, the Commission found that the Eritreans 
suffered significant losses of property at the hands of Ethiopian forces 
during the invasion,120 yet the evidence presented did not quantify the 
magnitude of that injury.121 The Commission did indicate that the 
evidence was available, but that the Commission “d[id] not have time or 
resources” to review the information.122 Instead, the Commission relied 
upon “a reasonable estimate of the losses.”123 These estimates are 
problematic. 
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When there was insufficient evidence for a claim, as often was the 
case, this type of “guesswork” became the default method for 
determining a conclusion.124 The result had to be either an amount that 
was completely false, because it was the product of a guess, or grossly 
ineffective, as the Commission was erring on the side of caution in that 
case.125 
In addition to the problems with the first type of discounting, the 
Commission also discounted to account for the wealth of the two 
countries.126 This type of discounting was not totally unreasonable. As 
the Commission points out, the amount of damages that Ethiopia 
requested was three times the entire GDP of Eritrea in 2005.127 The 
Commission was therefore concerned that since the countries were so 
poor and the damages so high, serious damages would further 
destabilize peace in the region, similar to what happened with the 
Treaty of Versailles and Germany after World War I.128 
Furthermore, the Commission was concerned that because the 
countries were so poor, large awards would cripple the governments’ 
ability to pay for the essential services that their people needed, and 
would force the governments to neglect their obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.129 These were 
serious considerations. The Commission’s purpose was to foster peace, 
stability, and compensate victims, not to further destabilize the region or 
take away services from the survivors of war. However, as reasonable 
as it sounds, this conclusion is problematic for various reasons. 
First, the Commission’s choice to abandon true compensation and 
adequate justice for victims in favor of political stability was just as 
likely to foster resentment and instability as payment of large awards. 
The Commission’s choice assured that the victims of the war would 
never receive the compensation they were due for their harms. Second, 
the Commission took a short-term view of the problem; there are 
countless examples of extremely poor countries that in a relatively short 
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period of time transformed into significant global economic leaders, 
such as China or Germany.130 
Unlike the Treaty of Versailles, the Algiers Agreement provided 
no mechanism for enforcement or a timetable for distribution of the 
awards.131 Consequently, the Commission could have provided that 
repayment for the majority of the awards be dependent upon the size of 
the countries’ economies, not upon any time deadline. If the countries 
were to become able to pay the damages without causing detriment to 
their own citizens, then they would. Otherwise, the amounts that the 
parties owed could stay close to the current discounted awards. This 
payment structure would have at least allowed for an opportunity to 
provide the victims with just compensation instead of discounted 
awards, a decision that guarantees that there will be no comparable 
opportunity. 
The problems related to the discounting of the awards and the fact 
that the awards negate each other would not be as problematic if the 
money exchanged between the two countries went directly to victims 
rather than to the other State’s general coffers. That still would have 
stood in the way of fair compensation for everyone, but it would not 
have been as extreme, and at least could have provided compensation 
for some. For example, the Commission awarded Eritrea and Ethiopia 
each two million dollars in parallel awards “for failing to prevent the 
rape of known and unknown victims in the towns of Senafe, Barentu 
and Teseney.”132 The Commission did so with the “hope that Eritrea 
(and Ethiopia) [would] use the funds awarded to develop and support 
health programs for women and girls in the affected areas.”133 In reality, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia will merely exchange checks for identical sums of 
money. Essentially, the result will be the same regardless of whether the 
Commission awards ten times the amount of money, or awards no 
money at all. On the other hand, if the States pay the rape victims 
directly or pay organizations that provide support to the rape victims, 
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then the award, regardless of the amount, would at least have some 
impact. 
C.  It Is Doubtful the Final Awards Furthered Peace and Stability 
Between the Two Countries 
Aside from the issue of just compensation, a serious question 
arises as to whether the final award will truly further the peace and 
stability between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This was the primary goal of the 
peace which the parties brokered in Algiers and from which the 
Commission arose.134 The long term impact of the final awards is still 
unclear; nevertheless, the immediate effects are troubling. Neither 
Eritrea nor Ethiopia has expressed satisfaction with the results of the 
Commission. In the opening paragraphs of the final award decisions, the 
Commission noted that the “awards of monetary compensation for 
damages are less—probably much less—than the Parties believe to be 
due.”135 
 The Ethiopian government has explicitly and publically expressed 
its dissatisfaction with the Commission’s ruling.136 Eritrea has accepted 
the award due to the final and binding nature of the Algiers Agreement, 
but has also expressed reservations about the final award amounts.137 
Additionally, Eritrea continues to express its dissatisfaction to the 
United Nations Security Council over the international community’s 
treatment of the conflict.138 This dissatisfaction has partially resulted in 
Eritrea isolating itself from the international community.139 As of the 
time of this Note, Ethiopia has still refused to allow the United Nations 
to demarcate the border with Eritrea.140 Eritrea has, as a result, further 
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isolated itself from the international community, and no money has been 
exchanged between Eritrea and Ethiopia for the victims of the border 
war. Relations between the parties have not progressed since they 
brokered the Algiers Agreement, despite the ten years’ work of the 
Commission.141 
IV.  INSTEAD OF A TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION MODEL, THE COMMISSION 
SHOULD HAVE MORE HEAVILY RELIED UPON THE MODEL OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE COMMISSION FOR REAL 
PROPERTY CLAIMS OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES 
This Note has presented flaws in the Commission, flaws in the 
final awards, and the consequences of these problems. The solution to 
many of these problems are systematic and could have been avoided if 
the structure of the Commission was, from the beginning, dramatically 
altered to match modern mass claim techniques utilized by the United 
Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) and the Commission for 
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees. 
A.  The Success of the United Nations Compensation Commission in 
Resolving Mass Claims Efficiently and with Relative Speed 
The UNCC is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations Security 
Council, which the Security Council established in 1991 to compensate 
victims of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.142 The UNCC did 
not have the task of deciding liability, but only determining damages, as 
the Security Council had already found that Iraq was liable for any 
losses that resulted from the invasion or occupation.143 The UNCC also 
had a similar task to that of the Commission’s after it had made its 
partial rulings; however, that is the extent of the similarities between the 
two bodies. 
As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated: 
[T]he Commission is not a court or an arbitral tribunal before which 
the parties appear; it is a political organ that performs an essentially 
fact-finding function of examining claims, verifying their validity, 
evaluating losses, assessing payments and resolving disputed claims; 
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it is only in this last respect that a quasi-judicial function may be 
involved.144 
The damages that the UNCC established were drawn directly from 
a special account that sales of Iraqi oil funded.145 The Secretary-
General, however, initially recommended that the amounts paid by Iraq 
should not exceed thirty percent of the value of its oil exports.146 The 
amount was ultimately reduced to twenty-five percent, pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1330, but the UNCC enacted the general 
scheme that the Secretary-General recommended.147 
The UNCC has been a resounding success. Since the Security 
Council established the UNCC in 1991, victims have filed more than 
2.6 million claims and have sought a total of approximately $368 billion 
in compensation.148 Out of these claims, the UNCC awarded 
compensation for 1,543,619 claims and, as of January 27, 2011, 
distributed a total of $31,303,180,576.149 The vast majority of these 
claims came from individuals for relatively small amounts.150 Victims 
filed all of these claims in a six-year span, with many of the claims 
falling under a January 1, 1995, deadline; other claims falling under a 
January 1, 1996, deadline; and the last group of claims falling under a 
February 1, 1997, deadline.151 The UNCC finished its processing task in 
2005 and made its last payments to individuals in 2007.152 
The UNCC was able to efficiently resolve a huge volume of cases 
and distribute a large volume of payments, while still safeguarding 
against frivolous claims, because it utilized a modern approach to mass 
claim processing. 
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One technique that the UNCC employed was to break down the 
types of claims which people could file into categories.153 Four of these 
categories provided for individual claims, one for corporate claims, and 
one for government claims.154 The UNCC dealt with the individual 
claims first and then addressed the other claims.155 This assured that 
priority was given to individual victims before governments. It also 
grouped and processed claims by common legal, factual, and valuation 
issues.156 Norbert Wühler, a former UNCC chief, observed that, 
“[g]iven the traditional emphasis in previous claims resolution 
processes on the losses suffered by governments and corporations, this 
humanitarian decision to focus first on urgent individual claims marked 
a significant step in the evolution of international claims practice.”157 
Another UNCC innovation was the use of computer software to 
match claims and information sampling to examine claims against 
existing databases and statistical models.158 This system contributed to 
the speed and efficiency with which it was able to work, as the UNCC 
could then quickly determine whether there was documentation to 
justify an award.159 
The UNCC also employed two different evidentiary standards:  
one for individual claims and one for businesses or government 
claims.160 “Appropriate evidence” of the circumstances and amount of 
the loss was sufficient as long as the evidence reached a “reasonable 
minimum” for the former.161 The UNCC, however, demanded 
documentation and other appropriate evidence “sufficient to 
demonstrate the circumstances and amount of the loss” for the latter.162 
In order to verify and evaluate the claims and evidence, the UNCC 
made considerable use of experts, consultants, and other specialists.163 
In addition to relying on experts, the UNCC had access to several fact 
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finding studies that the United Nations had commissioned shortly after 
the liberation of Kuwait, but before the filing of claims was even an 
option.164 These studies provided essential information for the UNCC in 
its work.165 These reports were effective because they were prepared 
under the authority of the United Nations and not one of the interested 
parties.166  
The UNCC also created specific claim forms that it then 
distributed to governments.167 A standardized claim form allowed the 
UNCC to more easily process the forms and avoid the issues with the 
claim forms which Eritrea and Ethiopia created.168 Governments and 
organizations filed individual claims with the UNCC; however, the 
governments acted as trustees for individuals.169 Conversely, the 
Commission processed individuals’ claims only as a means to reach a 
conclusion on the two government parties’ claims.170 
Much of the strength of the UNCC rested in its ability to safeguard 
individual claimants by using an inquisitorial process rather than an 
adversarial process. As one law professor explained: 
The use of an inquisitorial type of procedure for the claim resolution 
process has been described as the “signal distinction” of the 
Commission. . . . [A]n adversarial process would not have been able 
to achieve fundamental fairness for the individual claimants or Iraq. 
[It] would have likely resulted in patently unfair outcomes due to 
decisions based primarily on technical grounds, rather than the 
substantive merit of the claims.171 
A judicial or arbitral solution is useful in many circumstances but 
the organizers of the UNCC recognized that, in a situation involving 
mass claims for humanitarian violations, an inquisitorial model is more 
appropriate.172 This had become apparent, in part, when past attempts to 
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utilize the former model resulted in chaos.173 The unwieldy Iran–United 
States Claims Tribunal, a tribunal based on the traditional arbitration 
model similar to that of the Commission, is one example.174 The Iran–
United States Claims Tribunal worked at a very slow pace and had great 
difficulty with individual claims due to a lack of causation evidence.175 
The Commission should have learned from the past and referred to the 
UNCC’s established practices. 
B.  The Success of the Commission for Real Property Claims of 
Displaced Persons and Refugees in Resolving Mass Claims Efficiently 
and with Relative Speed 
The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons 
and Refugees (CRPC) was an international commission established to 
process and resolve claims by Bosnians who sought to reacquire 
property lost or left in the Bosnia–Herzegovina conflict of 1992 to 
1995.176 The CRPC was established in 1996 and completed its work in 
2003.177 During this period, the CRPC rendered a total of 311,757 
decisions,178 an incredible number of claims for such a short period of 
time. These decisions “are estimated to have benefitted close to one 
million people.”179 
Like the Commission, the CRPC arose out of a peace agreement, 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, which sought to end the Bosnian war.180 
The CRPC accepted claims directly from individuals.181 First, staff 
members interviewed claimants to gather evidence and then sorted the 
information in a computer database.182 The CRPC also crafted the forms 
for the claimants to fill out so that they were comprehensive and user-
friendly.183 To make a binding decision, a panel of judges then 
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examined the evidentiary record, information from the interviews, and 
any existing official registries.184 Like the UNCC, there was no 
adversarial process.185 
The CRPC returned the title of property to many individuals; 
however, it did so knowing that the local authorities were still 
responsible for facilitating the return of all real property.186 This means 
that a remedy for these victims might not be available for some time, 
but at least the victims have the authority for future legal action when it 
becomes politically feasible.187 This is the appropriate long-term view 
of remedies that the Commission should have taken. 
C.  A Similar Political Commission Solution is More Viable than a 
Judicial Solution Due to the History of, and Current Power Struggle 
Between, Eritrea and Ethiopia 
The UNCC, the CRPC, and the countries involved in those two 
structures have many similarities to the Commission and the parties 
involved in that Commission. The countries involved in all of these, for 
the most part, were relatively poor and had recently been through 
significant military conflicts.188 Indeed, each crisis is unique and will 
require its own approach. For example, Iraq is unique in that it had a 
strong source of revenue in oil.189 Despite these differences, there are 
still enough similarities between these structures that there will always 
be important lessons from which future commissions can draw. It is 
evident that the Commission could have achieved more success by more 
closely following the examples of prior mass claims processes.  
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V.  TIME, RESOURCES, AND WILL ARE POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO 
SELECTING AND IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS THAT UTILIZES SUCCESSFUL 
FEATURES OF PAST MASS CLAIMS MECHANISMS, BUT THESE OBSTACLES 
ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE 
There are justifiable reasons why the Commission handled only 
inter-State claims and followed a traditional arbitration model, albeit 
with a few innovative measures, instead of handling individual claims 
through a modern mass claims process like the aforementioned 
commissions. The most significant reasons are time, resources, and will; 
however, in hindsight, these three impediments are not impassable road 
blocks. 
Arguably, the most imposing barrier is the lack of money and 
resources. The Commission repeatedly bemoaned its lack of sufficient 
resources and how this inhibited them from performing at a high 
level.190 At one point, the Commission directly contrasted itself to the 
UNCC, explaining that it could not achieve what the Compensation 
Commission did for lack of resources.191 These complaints are accurate 
and fair. Both the UNCC and the CRPC had much larger budgets than 
the Commission and employed much larger staffs. The administrative 
costs of the UNCC from the time it began through 2005 totaled $362.6 
million.192 Conversely, the CPRC had a much smaller budget; it used 
approximately $33.49 million from 1997 to 2003.193 
Consequently, both commissions had a much larger working staff 
than the Commission. The UNCC had “[a]t its height . . . approximately 
three hundred professional and general services staff.”194 The CRPC 
even had over 250 staff members running its operations.195 
Alternatively, the Commission was comprised of only five 
commissioners.196 As opposed to the other commissioners, these 
commissioners worked only on a part-time basis.197 The Permanent 
Court of Arbitration provided some support, but the Commission 
employed no full-time staff.198 The actual expense figures for the 
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Commission have not been made public yet, but it is known that it was 
quite modest in relation to these other commissions.199 
As modest as the budget may have been, it did not have to stand in 
the way of utilizing an efficient and effective mass claims procedure. 
First, gathering and sharing technologies developed by past tribunals 
should lower the cost of future ones.200 Accordingly, the Commission 
did not have to reinvent the wheel and its costs did not have to be as 
significant as that of the UNCC. Second, because the Commission was 
tailored as an adversarial model, both Eritrea and Ethiopia must have 
spent a substantial sum on attorneys’ fees and expert legal consultants, 
which instead could have been used to supplement the budget. For five 
to ten years, Ethiopia employed eleven lawyers and consultants and 
Eritrea employed seventeen lawyers and consultants to work on their 
cases before the Commission.201 Third, the necessary costs are not truly 
overly imposing. For all that it did, the UNCC’s budget was only 
actually 0.1% of the amount of claims asserted before the 
Commission.202 Furthermore, the entire cost of the UNCC’s fourteen 
years of operation was roughly only a half a percent of Ethiopia’s 
annual gross domestic product203 and only nine percent of Eritrea’s 
annual gross domestic product.204 
Additionally, the costs should not have barred a modern mass 
claims process that would have been more successful in providing just 
compensation, because the Commission had already done a lot of the 
work in creating a model for such a procedure.205 This underscores how 
the excuse of funding can really be a veiled justification when there is a 
lack of will. The lack of will was not only present within the 
Commission and the participating States, but also in the international 
community. The amount of money necessary for a mass claims 
procedure is very insignificant in relation to the global economy, and it 
is not unprecedented that, in the interest of peace and security, the 
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international community has funded similar projects. For example, the 
majority of the CRPC’s budget was paid by a collection of international 
states.206 Furthermore, the international community spent $1.32 billion, 
a significantly higher amount than would be necessary for a mass claims 
procedure, to support the UNMEE mission.207 
Another issue is the source of funds necessary to fairly compensate 
the victims. In Iraq, the UNCC was able to levy a portion of Iraq’s oil 
revenue to compensate the victims,208 but neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia 
has an industry that is as reliably profitable.209 Nevertheless, if the 
countries were able to find enough resources to engage in war, then 
there should have been no excuse to find the money necessary to 
compensate the victims of their war. The amount spent on the war was 
not negligible either; Ethiopia paid approximately three billion 
dollars.210 
Furthermore, compensation need not be immediate, as it could be a 
long-term, structured project. The possibility of compensation in the 
future is better than none at all. As the citizens of the countries involved 
are very poor, the amounts necessary for individual claims should be 
relatively insubstantial. This was the case with the UNCC where the 
amounts for individual claims were relatively small amounts.211 
However, small awards can make a huge difference to these individual 
victims. 
Before the UNCC began, there were critics who claimed that the 
project was doomed because there would never be enough money to 
award all of the claims.212 This was not a reason to abandon the project, 
however. Indeed, the UNCC was consequently able to compensate a 
large number of victims.213 
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The final substantial impediment is time. Dr. Norbert Wühler, the 
director of the IOM, highlighted that “in every mass claims programme, 
a tension exists . . . between the search for individual justice and 
fairness and the requirement of an expedient process that resolves all the 
claims within a reasonable time period.”214 The Commission stressed 
that many of the organizational and procedural steps it took were due to 
a desire to finish proceedings as quickly as possible and help the victims 
immediately.215 This, however, effectively sacrificed actual and just 
compensation to the victims. Instead, the Commission should have 
committed more time to making its determination, if it meant that 
ultimately the Commission could fairly compensate the victims. 
Further, both the UNCC and the CRPC illustrate that the time 
needed by the Commission to adequately compensate the victims should 
not have been much longer than the Commission took to conclude. The 
Commission spent almost ten years to reach a final decision on 
awards.216 Furthermore, there has yet to be any payments made.217 
Alternatively, the UNCC started in 1991 and had completely finished 
processing claims by the end of 2005.218 It made its last payments in 
2007.219 The CRPC was established in 1996 and ended in 2003.220 The 
difference between these three commissions is negligible, considering 
the benefit that could have been gained by taking the slightly longer 
approach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Commission has been successful in many regards. Professor 
Won Kidane, who worked with Ethiopia during the Commission, 
described many of its successes:   
(1) It has contributed to the development of norms of international 
humanitarian law in the civil compensation context, (2) it has 
significantly contributed to the emerging consensus regarding the 
status of some norms of international humanitarian law as customary 
norms, (3) it has identified gaps in the existing standards of 
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international humanitarian law and suggested the development of 
new norms to fill those gaps, (4) it has refined procedures and 
evidentiary standards of adjudication for mass claims processes, 
(5) it has clearly demonstrated that there is a feasible way to 
determine civil liability for violations of international humanitarian 
law occurring during and in the aftermath of armed conflict for the 
compensation of victims of such violations, and most importantly, 
(6) it has shown that determination of civil liability is a realistic 
alternative and an important supplement to criminal prosecution as a 
mechanism of enforcement of violations of humanitarian law.221 
Absent from this list, however, is “relief and compensation for the 
victims of Eritrea–Ethiopia border war” and “peace and security in the 
region.” 
The Algiers Agreement provided a mandate for the Commission 
that should have forced more individual claims, instead of allowing only 
inter-State claims.222 There are good examples in recent history that 
could have guided the Commission in processing these claims, resulting 
in more substantial benefit to the individual victims. 
In particular, there are five primary lessons that the Commission 
should have learned. First, and most importantly, the Commission 
should have focused on individuals instead of governments. The 
Commission created a mass claims process, but it did not necessitate its 
use or prioritize individual claims over government claims in the way 
that the UNCC did. Second, the Commission should have allowed the 
time necessary to run a modern mass claim process. Both the CRPC and 
the UNCC were relatively short enterprises with ultimately very little 
benefit in trying to keep stringent deadlines. Third, the Commission 
should have abandoned its reliance on an adversarial approach, and 
instead should have approached the violations of humanitarian 
international law as an impartial investigatory organ like the CRPC and 
the UNCC. The Commission also should have developed standardized 
claim forms, such as the ones the CRPC and the UNCC utilized, to 
assure consistency and efficiency. This would have reduced both costs 
and time, while still allowing the Commission the flexibility to award 
damages more easily to the victims of the war. 
Fourth, the Commission should have allowed impartial experts and 
organizations to file information directly to the Commission, instead of 
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through the government parties, and should have conducted more of its 
own independent research, much like how the UNCC had its own 
unbiased reports on which to rely. This would have made it easier for 
the Commission to finish its work more easily and more sufficiently. 
Lastly, the Commission should have focused on remedies through a 
long-term lens. Instead of discounting the amounts necessary for 
compensation, the Commission should have followed the example of 
the CRPC and granted remedies that might not have been as practical or 
enforceable currently, but that could have become more meaningful and 
feasible in the future. 
The Commission and its commissioners worked extremely hard 
and were extremely clever in their approach to problems that arose. 
Nevertheless, due to many circumstances in and out of their control, the 
result was a negligible award that most likely will not justly compensate 
a majority of the victims or significantly further peace between Eritrea 
and Ethiopia. This should serve as an example to the international 
community when a similar situation arises in the future—that it is better 
and not much more costly (in time or resources) to implement a modern 
mass claims process that is effective in compensating victims and 
furthering humanitarian goals than it is to adhere to a traditional 
arbitration or judicial model. 
